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Abstract 
 Automatic identification systems represent a wide classification of devices used primarily in commercial 
settings for inventory/logistics control. Familiar examples of such devices are bar codes, magnetic strips, smart 
cards, RFID (Radio frequency identification) and biometric and voice recognition. Security is especially lax in low 
powered RF (radio frequency) systems communicating through an unsecured radio wave channel. Security represents 
a critical component for enabling the large scale adoption of automatic identification systems. Providing an effective 
security solution for low powered systems is a major area of concern; it directs research towards ‘power 
consumption aware’ computations in security solutions. This paper proposes a Lightweight Inter-Zonal 
Authentication Protocol for moving objects in low powered RF systems. Formal validation and a thorough analysis 
of the protocol in SPAN security tool reveals its effectiveness and resiliency to attacks–eaves dropping, reader and 
tag impersonation, replay and desynchronization. 
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1. Introduction 
Though identification systems may employ smart cards, magnetic strips, RFID (Radio 
Frequency IDentification), biometric and voice recognition, they are currently predominantly barcode 
systems. Technological advancements impose the necessity for real-time data acquisition, compelling 
systems to become assertive in terms of tracking and monitoring. In recent times, there has been an 
increased deployment of low powered RF systems for tracking and monitoring of different objects like 
assets, humans, vehicles etc. Low powered RF devices provide considerable advantages over barcodes- 
data can be read automatically without the object being in line of sight of a reader or system authenticator. 
Moreover, data can be sent at a rate of hundreds of data units per second, and from a distance of several 
meters (depending on the area of coverage of the RF system). Open wireless communication channels in 
RF systems are similar to wireless mobile communications. As a result, the system air interface is 
susceptible to security threats and attacks similar to those in wireless mobile communications. Security 
issue becomes a key concern and the systems are designed to provide effective security. Reliable security 
solutions for RF applications demand security requirements with respect to authentication, integrity, 
privacy, anonymity, session freshness, synchronization. Interesting threads of research in this direction 
have been the focus of [1]-[6]. As RF systems are chiefly low-powered, it is important that the security 
solutions take into consideration computing over heads. Light weight schemas have become the focus of 
research for securing RF systems [7]-[12]. 
Survey in [13], [14] examine and bring out several aspects related to low powered RF system 
security. Security threats to RF systems can be put into several classes [15], [16]; Sniffing (or 
Eavesdropping), Spoofing, Cloning, Replay, Relay, and Denial of Service attacks. Any form of 
unauthorized access to the objects fall under the category of eavesdropping/sniffing. A rogue 
authenticator may read sensitive and confidential data of an object, record it and use it to breach 
authentication data exchanges. The highest level of security risk to a low powered RF systems network is 
sniffing/eavesdropping attack [15]. Spoofing attacks involve rogue entities not only secretly scanning and 
recording data transmissions from a legitimate object but also copying the object’s ID and making itself 
appear to be valid. Replay attack involves using an object’s response to an authenticator’s challenge to 
impersonate the object [17]. These attacks can be countered in RF systems by providing privacy 
protection and authentication [1], [2], [7], [18-20]. 
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RF systems use low cost tag/label for identifying objects and obviously are restricted in terms of 
storage capacity and computational power [21]. Low powered RF systems need to benefit from light 
weight solutions to security. Use of simple operations and limited cryptographic functionalities permit 
minimum levels of computations and energy consumptions, while at the same time supporting 
cryptographic goals of security. Security solutions for RF systems can be classified by the weight of 
cryptographic primitives used- Middle-weight, light-weight and ultra-lightweight solutions. Middleweight 
solutions [22], [23] for applications with higher security requirements such as finance, and military) use 
full symmetric/asymmetric encryption (e.g., elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)). Lightweight solutions 
use operations and functions such as cyclic redundancy code (CRC) operator, message authentication 
code (MAC) and hash function. While research has focused on light weight solutions for RF systems 
security, the studies from [8]-[10] suggests the use of simple and basic bitwise logical operations, shift 
operations and pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) which support the least computationally 
demanding class called the ultra-lightweight. 
Proposes a light weight mutual authentication and ownership management scheme by using 
limited cryptographic functionality [1]. The scheme is done in two phases. Phase 1 covers the mutual 
authentication between entities in a RF system and Phase 2 covers the delegation and ownership 
managements. Rahman et.al [7] presents a lightweight mutual authentication protocol to achieve basic 
security goals, i.e. confidentiality, integrity and authentication using a unique choice of pseudorandom 
numbers. The authentication process in [2] introduces time stamps to help protect tag privacy and prevent 
the tracking from an attacker. On the other hand, [18] Osaka et al. proposes a light weight security 
method for RF systems that achieves the security requirements using hash functions, symmetric 
cryptography, and the XOR operation. This security system achieves several security requirements: the 
indistinguishability, the forward security, the security against the replay attack, and the security against 
the tag killing. Further, the proposed method allows for ownership transfer. The proposed method is 
reasonably efficient, but vulnerable to tracking and DoS attacks brought out by [24]. This is done by 
manipulating the value of the random number of the tag. Moreover, as brought out in [25], an attacker can 
add noise to the final message exchange of [18] resulting in the tag holding incorrect secret information, 
due to which any subsequent authentication would fail. 
While [1], [18] have not considered mobile RF systems, [19] implements a light weight 
authentication for mobile RF system with grouped tags to identify objects. The authentication for tags is 
based on PRNG mainly because the low-cost tags are restricted in storage capacity and computational 
power. The Authentication readers are based on hash-function, as reader obviously are not restricted by 
storage capacity and computation power. The protocol provides security against reader impersonation 
attack, tag impersonation attack and tracking. Weis et.al [26] proposed a RF system in which the object’s 
identification is hidden using random numbers in the object’s responses to avoid its reuse. This system 
addresses traceability by applying an exhaustive search, but at the cost of an increase in the work load of 
the back-end server to identify and verify the object. This scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks 
by querying the object for a valid pair and then forwarding this pair to an authenticator for validation. Yu 
et al.’s [27] protocol uses a 128-bit key set that is dynamically updated by the server. It uses the least 
significant 30 bits of the tag ID used to identify the object for authentication. However, this results in the 
possibility of compromising the security of the system as a whole, as the uniqueness aspect of a tag ID to 
identify an object is reduced, by reducing the number of bits used by the tag ID for authentication. 
This paper proposes a Light-weight Inter-zonal Authentication Protocol for moving objects in 
low powered RF systems. The protocol is designed for ‘power consumption aware’ computations in 
security solutions. The work presented in this paper is divided into 3 phases: System Registration phase, 
zonal authentication phase and mutual authentication phase. In phase 1, the object must register itself to 
the system authenticator (SA). The RFID network is partitioned into various zones based on the coverage 
of the authenticator of the RF system in a particular area. In phase 2 and phase 3, several events of 
handshakes are performed between both the object and ZA, object and IZA to mutually authenticate each 
other and start communicating. This protocol can be adopted by object monitoring and tracking systems 
for providing secure and reliable data exchanges. The protocol has been verified against security attacks 
which include eavesdropping, spoofing, authenticator and object impersonation, replay and 
desynchronization by using the SPAN security tool for formal validation of the protocol. 
The contributions of the work presented in the paper are: (i) A multi-zonal authentication schema 
resilient to eavesdrop, replay, authenticator and impersonation and desynchronization (ii) An inter-zonal 
authentication protocol that mutually verifies both the tracked object and the authenticator/reader (iii) A 
light-weight authentication schema performing PRNG, XOR, XTEA with very less computation overhead 
[28]. The work presented in this paper contributes to ‘power consumption aware’ computations in 
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security solutions. A Lightweight Inter-zonal Authentication protocol for moving objects in low powered 
RF systems is proposed. The protocol uses ultra-light weight XOR and PRNG functions for passing and 
decoding random numbers. Time stamps are used in interactive sessions between an object and an 
authenticator to keep the freshness of the challenge-response information in each communication round. 
Two or more handshakes between the communicating devices is defined as an event. LC (Logical Clock) 
value present in the communicating devices increments simultaneously on verification of every event. 
Each communicating device maintains its own LC value. A mismatch in LC value between 
communicating devices terminates the communication between them. XTEA (Extended Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm) is used for both encryption and decryption. Wheeler and Needham in [29] made extension to 
TEA algorithm (XTEA) which is a lightweight block cipher. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
The proposed work, a 3-phase Light-weight Inter-zonal Authentication scheme is discussed in length in 
Section 2. Analysis of the proposed protocol in terms of resiliency to security attacks and performance is 
presented in Sections 3. The formal validation of the proposed protocol using the SPAN security tool is 
presented in Section 3.5. The paper is concluded in Section 4. 
 
 
2.    Research Method 
2.1. RF System Architecture 
RF systems largely consist of authenticator and objects; both of which are responsible for 
verifying the identity of each other invariably ensuring communication with only the intended parties. 
This paper proposes a Light-weight Inter-zonal Authentication Protocol for moving objects in low 
powered RF systems. The protocol uses a ticket based authentication approach using cryptographic 
operations-XOR, PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generation) and XTEA (Extended Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm). The multi zonal architecture of the proposed protocol is shown in Figure 1. The architecture 
includes one SA (System Authenticator) for the entire system. On the onset, the SA registers all the 
objects to be identified to the system -1 as shown in Figure 1. It is structured to encompass many zones, 
where each zone defines a geographical region of authentication. The system is partitioned into multiple 
zones, each employing a ZA (Zonal Authenticator) to authenticate inbound registered objects -2 as shown 
in Figure 1. Each zone allows communication between objects and Inter Zonal Authenticator (IZA) only 
after mutual authentication -3 as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Multi zonal architecture 
 
 
The proposed mutual authentication protocol is organized to operate in three phases- System 
Registration phase, Zonal Authentication and Mutual Authentication phase. System registration of an 
object with the SA generates an encrypted system ticket and sets the identification of the source zone 
(IDZONE-S), identification of tag (IDOBJECT) and LC (Logical Clock) value for the object. The Zonal 
Authentication of an object with the ZA verifies the system ticket and generates an encrypted zonal ticket. 
The zonal ticket is used for further authentication of the object by an inter-zonal authenticator. The 
entities and their roles of the multi zonal RF system are explicated in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Entities and roles 
Entity Role Data/Information stored and handled 
SA Registers an unregistered 
object to the RF networked 
system. 
1. A list of registered objects with their identification (IDOBJECT) and default 
zone identification (IDZONE) 
2. System ticket 
ZA Authenticates the object for the 
zone. 
1. A list of access passwords and LC values for all the registered objects. 
2. A list of registered objects and their identification. 
3. A list of ticket keys (kZA-IZA) used between the ZA and IZA. 
ZR 
 
 
 
Object 
Communicates with the object 
after mutual authentication. 
 
 
Entity to be authenticated 
1. A list of LC values for all the registered object. 
2. A list of registered object and their identification. 
IDZONE, IDOBJECT, LC, System Ticket, Zone Ticket 
TicketSYSTEM – (IDOBJECT, IDZONE-S, T0, Tmax, Timestamp, R+S)kZA-IZA 
TicketZONE – (IDOBJECT, IDZONE, T0, Tmax, Timestamp, R+S)kZA-IZA 
 
 
2.2. Proposed Light-weight Inter-zonal Authentication Protocol 
The assumptions made in designing the protocol are: 
1. All entities in the RF system namely, objects and authenticator trust the System Authenticator (SA) 
and Zonal authenticator (ZA). 
2. The Authenticators (SA and ZA) maintains the list of ticket keys of all the inter-zonal authenticators 
in the setup. 
3. Only the Authenticators (SA and ZA) can access the memory contents of the object to be identified. 
The proposed protocol is a three phase mutual authentication protocol. The first phase is the 
System Registration Phase that registers an object with the RF networked System, generating a System 
Ticket. The subsequent phase is the Zonal Authentication phase. It authenticates a registered object when 
it is inbound into a zone, generating a Zonal Ticket. The last phase of the protocol is the Mutual 
Authentication phase. It mutually authenticates the object in a zone and the inter-zonal authenticator 
before any application processing is performed by the reader. Notations and terms used in the proposed 
protocol as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Notation and Terms 
Notation Description 
IDZONE Identification number of Zone 
IDOBJECT Identification number of Object 
PRNG( ) 
R, S, U 
TICKETZONE 
KZA-IZA 
LC 
T0 
Tmax 
ZA 
IZA 
RN 
SA 
Pseudo Random Number function 
16-bit Random numbers 
Ticket for a particular Zone 
Key shared by Zonal authenticator and the inter Zonal authenticator 
Logical clock-16-bit integer value 
Time of connection establishment 
Maximum time until the connection holds without disconnecting 
Zonal authenticator 
Inter zonal authenticator 
Random Number 
System authenticator 
 
 
2.2.1. Phase I: System Registration Phase 
This phase writes significant data in the memory of the object for authentication to be performed 
by ZA and IZA. The SA writes IDZONE-s - Identification number of start zone, IDOBJECT- Identification 
number of object and LC–Logical clock (16-bit integer value, initially zero) into the objects memory. The 
SA then sends the system ticket to the object thus registering it in the RF networked system. As shown in 
Figure 2. 
A registered tag contains the following after the system registration phase:  
1. IDZONE-S - Identification number of start zone 
2. IDOBJECT- Identification number of object  
3. LC – Logical clock (16-bit integer value, initially zero)  
4. TicketSYSTEM – (IDOBJECT, IDZONE-S, T0, Tmax, Timestamp, R+S)KZA-IZA. 
A ticket in the proposed protocol is encrypted using the shared secret key KZA-IZA, between ZA and IZR of 
a Zone. The encryption with KZA-IZA is performed to prevent alteration of the contents by any 
unauthorized entity. IDOBJECT and IDZONE allow verification of the object and zone. The values T0, Tmax 
and Timestamp permits verification of ticket validity. A ticket is valid only if (Current timestamp – 
           n          ISSN: 2528-2417 
APTIKOM J. CSIT  Vol. 2, No. 3,  2017 :  106 – 116 
110
Timestamp in the ticket) < (Tmax–T0). The value (R+S) are 16 bit random numbers generated by ZA. 
(R+S) serves as one of the components for mutual authentication and is available to IZA via the ticket. 
LC is logical clock that keeps track of the number of times handshakes have been performed for an object 
in a zone. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Phase I–system registration: registration of an object with the RF system 
 
 
2.2.2. Phase II: Zonal Authentication Phase 
The RF networked system is partitioned into a number of zones based on the coverage of the RF 
authenticators, each zone defining a geographical region of authentication. A zone consists of one ZA and 
multiple IZA’s as illustrated in Figure 1. Zonal authentication refers to the authentication of inbound 
registered objects into any one of the zones in the RF networked system. This process is detailed 
in Figure 3. ZA of a zone accesses an inbound object by accessing its memory and checks for IDZONE 
written in the object at registration or any previous zonal authentication. If the IDZONE in the object does 
not match the current zone, then the ZA sets the appropriate IDZONE, issues a zonal ticket for that zone and 
resets LC for the registered object. If the IDZONE matches the current zone, then ZA stores a 16-bit random 
number S and stores it in the object’s memory. It then queries the object for a ticket, this may be a system 
ticket or a zonal ticket. ZA checks for the ticket’s validity and authenticates the object. In case a ticket’s 
validity has expired (invalid ticket), the ticket is renewed at the ZA. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Phase II–zonal authentication phase 
 
 
After the Zonal Registration Phase, the registered object contains the following: 
1. IDZONE - Identification number of zone. 
2. IDOBJECT- Identification number of object. 
3. LC – Logical clock (16-bit integer value). 
4. TicketZONE – (IDOBJECT, IDZONE, T0, Tmax, Timestamp, R+S)kZA-IZA.  
5. S 
6. R^S 
As depicted in Figure 3 a zonal ticket is issued by ZA along with R^S, the XOR of 16-bit 
random numbers R and S. XOR operation is commutative and associative in nature. An important 
property of the XOR operation is the following property:( 𝐴 	^	(𝐵)	)^𝐵 = 𝐴-(1). ZA generates S and 
stores it in the object’s memory. It generates R and sends R^S to the object. The value of R can be 
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obtained from R^S only if the value of S is known and vice versa. As a result, the object can obtain the 
value of R from R^S using the value of S stored in it. Using R and S, the object computes (R+S), which 
serves as one of the components for mutual authentication. It is not possible for an unauthorised entity to 
obtain R or S from R^S. This property prevents unauthorized/illegal entities from obtaining R and S in 
order to successfully impersonate as system registered object/authenticator.  
 
2.2.3. Phase III: Mutual Authentication Phase 
Registered objects and IZA are mutually authenticated in phase III, before any application 
processing is performed. Steps 2 and 3 in Figure 4. Account for the handshake performed by the object 
and IZA towards mutual authentication. IZA queries the object in the zone for TICKETZONE. The object 
responds by sending TicketZONE and PRNG(R + S + LC) to IZA. IZA obtains R+S by decrypting the 
ticket using the key it shares with ZA. LC of that object is added to (R+S) and PRNG(R+S+LC) sent by 
the object in step 2 of Figure 4. is verified by IZA by performing the same PRNG(R+S+LC) and 
comparing the two values. This authenticates the object to the IZA. IZA authenticates itself to the object 
by sending PRNG(U) and U ^(R+S). The object obtains U by performing (U^(R+S))^(R+S). It performs 
PRNG(U), verifies the PRNG(U) sent by the IZA in step 3 of Figure 4 to authenticate the IZA. After 
successful authentication, LC is updated by both the object and the authenticators. This phase mutually 
authenticates the object and IZA ensuring that the communication is with only the intended parties in the 
RF networked system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Phase III–mutual authentication phase 
 
 
XOR and PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator) are the main cryptographic operations 
used in the proposed protocol. Contribution of XOR operation towards securing the proposed 
authentication scheme has been highlighted in Phase II discussion. PRNG() function generates a random 
number using a seed. An important property of PRNG() function is that it is a one-way function–the seed 
cannot be obtained from the random number. It is not possible for an illegal/unauthorised authenticator to 
obtain the seed (U) and authenticate itself as a legal IZA of the zone. The properties of both XOR and 
PRNG are exploited to provide a secure authentication protocol that is resilient to eavesdropping attack, 
Authenticator and object impersonation attack, replay attack and desynchronization attack. 
 
 
3. Security Analysis and Results 
Resiliency of the proposed protocol with respect to different types of attacks is analyzed 
in this section. 
 
3.1. Eavesdropping Attack 
Eavesdropping attack is an unauthorised real-time interception of the communication between an 
object and an authenticator. An adversary A, may acquire R^S, PRNG(R+S+LC), ticket, PRNG(U) and 
(U^(R+S)) from the communication (Phase II and Phase III) between an authenticator and an object. A 
successful attack can be performed on the RF networked system iff A can perform the following from the 
intercepted contents: 
a. Decrypt the encrypted system/zonal ticket to obatin its contents  
b. Obtain 16 bit random numbers R,S and U 
c. Obtain LC and compute R+S+LC  
The proposed protocol is secure against eavesdropping: 
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a. Ticket is encrypted using KZA-IZA –The eavesdropper cannot gain any valuable information from a 
ticket without knowing the shared secret key KZA-IZR. 
b. It is not possible for an eavesdropper to obtain R or S from R^S or U from (U^(R+S)) due to the 
XOR property in (eqn.1).  
c. PRNG() function is a one-way function, as a result of this property the eavesdropper cannot obtain 
the values of (R+S+LC), U from PRNG(R+S+LC) and PRNG(U). 
 
3.2. Authenticator/Object Impersonation Attack 
Authenticator-impersonation refers to a process in which an adversary-authenticator A, deceives 
a registered object to authenticate it as a valid authenticator. Whereas, object-impersonation is the process 
in which an adversary- object A, deceives a genuine authenticator to authenticate it as a valid object. For 
authenticator/object- impersonation attacks to be successful, A must perform the following: 
a. Access memory contents of an object. 
b. Obtain contents of system/zonal ticket. 
 
The proposed protocol is secure against authenticator/object-impersonation: 
a. Only the SA and ZA can access the memory contents of the objects as assumed in the protocol. 
Therefore, an adversary A cannot access the memory contents of the object.  
b. Tickets in the proposed protocol are encrypted using the secret key (KZA-IZA,) shared between the 
zonal authenticator and inter-zonal authenticators in a zone. An impersonating authenticator A has to 
obtain KZA-IZA, in order to decrypt the ticket and extract the data needed for authentication. 
 
3.3. Replay Attack 
Replay attack is performed when an adversary (object or authenticator) A, captures and attempts 
to reuse the authentication component used in handshake. A captures the authentication component 
PRNG(R+S+LC) in Phase III, and attempts to replay it (later on) in another authentication session with an 
authenticator. Logical Clock LC, is an incrementing software counter maintained in each process by 
which the happened-before ordering can be captured numerically [30]. LC is used in the protocol to resist 
replay attacks. LC values are updated for each authentication by both the object and IZA. For replay 
attack to be successful A must has the correct LC value of a particular authentication session. This is not 
possible as the LC value is updated after every handshake in phase III. In Figure 5(a) LC is updated to 
LC’ by both the object and IZA after handshake in phase III. Figure 5(b) illustrates a replay attack, where 
A (adversary object) replays the TICKETZONE, PRNG(R+S+LC) captured from the session #n during 
session #(n+i). Since LC ≠LC’, the authentication fails. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Replay attack 
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3.4. Desynchronization Attack 
An adversary A, performs desynchronization attack with an intent to disrupt the authentication 
process. A desynchronization attack on the RF system forces the object and authenticator to update their 
common values to different values. In the proposed protocol, LC is a logical clock that keeps track of the 
number of times handshakes have been performed for an object in a zone. The LC values are updated by 
the object and the IZA only after a successful handshake in Phase III. A desynchronization attack can be 
successful iff the LC updating is desynchronised; LC in the proposed protocol is not updated if the 
handshake in Phase III is unsuccessful. As a result, the adversary cannot perform a desynchronization 
attack to disrupt the authentication process of the proposed protocol.  
 
3.5. Performance Analysis 
Table 3 illustrates an analysis of the proposed protocol in terms resiliency requirements against 
eavesdropping, impersonation, replay, and desynchronization. Performance of the proposed protocol is 
analyzed for the time complexity of the operations (TXOR-time complexity of the XOR operation, 
TRNG-time complexity of the random number generation operation, TPRNG-time complexity of Pseudo 
Random number function, TEDC-time complexity of the encryption/decryption cryptosystem) used in 
mutual authentication. Table 4 projects the total time complexity at an object and an authenticator. The 
proposed protocol performs 2 XOR operations at the object in Phase II and III, 2 XOR operations at the 
authenticator in phase II and III. Accounting for a total of 4 XOR operations performed by the object and 
authenticator at the end of phase II and phase III. The total of 2 PRNG operations is performed by the 
object in phase III, 2 PRNG operations at the authenticator in phase III. Accounting for a total of 4 PRNG 
operations performed by the object and authenticator at the end of phase II and phase III. Two Random 
number generation operations are performed at the authenticator in phase II. Only one 
encryption/decryption operation is performed at the authenticator in phase II and phase III. Therefore, a 
successful mutual authentication in a zone requires a time complexity of 2TXOR+2TPRNG at the object and 
2TXOR + 2TPRNG+1TEDC+2TRNG at the authenticator. Object’s data/information may be required to be 
processed by more than one authenticator in a zone, accounting for multiple authentications. The number 
of times (x) a object is authenticated in a zone accounts for a total of x *(4TXOR+4TPRNG +1TEDC+2TRNG). 
Performance Analysis of MKT phase (mutual authentication, key update and ticket computation) in [1] is 
analyzed for the time complexity of the operations (TXOR-time complexity of the XOR operation, TRNG 
- time complexity of the random number generation operation, TPRNG-time complexity of Pseudo 
Random number function, TPER-time complexity of permutation operation, TMOD - time complexity of 
modulus operation) used in mutual authentication. 
Table 5 projects the total time complexity at a tag identifying the object and a reader 
(authenticator). The protocol in [1] performs 75 XOR operations at the tag in MKT phase, 63 XOR 
operations at the Reader in MKT phase. Accounting for a total of 138 XOR operations performed by the 
tag and reader at the end of MKT phase. The total of 72 PRNG operations is performed by the tag in 
MKT phase, 36 PRNG operations at the Reader in MKT phase. Accounting for a total of 36 PRNG 
operations performed by the tag and reader at the end of MKT phase. 12 permutation operations, 2 
Random number generation operations are performed at the reader in mutual authentication phase. 6 
modulus operations are performed at the tag in mutual authentication phase. Therefore, a successful 
mutual authentication requires a time complexity of 75TXOR+36TPRNG+12TPER`+6TMOD at the tag and 
63TXOR+2TRNG+36TPRNG at the reader. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of related protocols 
Security methods Eavesdropping Impersonation Replay attack Desynchronization 
[1] Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[2] 
[31] 
[3] 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Proposed protocol Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Table 4. The Performance of analysis of the 
propose protocol 
Object Authenticators(ZA and IZA) 
2TXOR+2TPRNG 2TXOR+2TPRNG+1TEDC+2TRNG 
 
Table 5. The Performance Analysis of mutual 
authentication, key update and ticket 
computation in [1] 
Object  Reader(Authenticator) 
75TXOR+36TPRNG+12TPER`+6TMOD 63TXOR+2TRNG+36TPRNG 
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Performance analysis in Table 4 and Table 5 infers that the proposed protocol in this paper 
functions with a lesser time complexity compared to the MKT phase of the protocol proposed in [1].  
 
3.6. Formal Validation of the Proposed Protocol 
SPAN is a security protocol animator for HLPSL and CAS+ specifications that is similar 
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications). It facilities analysis of 
large-scale Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications. SPAN implements an active intruder 
that allows to interactively find and build attacks over protocols. SPAN automatically build an attack 
message sequence chart on HLPSL and CAS+ specification of the protocol using the AVISPA 
verification tools. CL-Atse is one such AVISPA verification tool. It is an efficient versatile automatic 
analyser for the security of the cryptographic protocols. State-based security property like secrecy, 
authentication and fairness can be modelled using the CL-Atse tool and the algebraic properties of 
operators like XOR or exponentiation are taken into account with much less limitations compared to other 
tools, thanks to a complete modular unification algorithm. The intruder simulation of the proposed 
protocol is done using SPAN. The intruder simulation of the proposed protocol is shown in Figure 6. The 
protocol was found to safe from intruder attacks. In addition to the intruder simulation, an CL-Atse tool 
verification for proposed protocol was performed. Figure 7 and Figure 8 displays the CL-Atse tool 
summary check for the proposed protocol. The proposed protocol was found to be secure against various 
attacks simulated by the CL-Atse tool. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Intruder simulation using SPAN security tool 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. CL-Atse security check output summary 
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Figure 8. CL-Atse security check output summary 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
In this paper, a Light-weight Inter-zonal Authentication Protocol for moving objects in low 
powered RF systems. This was done by employing the ultra-light-weight the PRNG function and XOR 
operation. Such use of a simple operation adds a minimal level of computation and energy consumption 
for low-powered RF systems while, at the same time, supports the cryptographic goals of the protocol. 
The proposed protocol was verified for security attacks and was formally validated using the SPAN 
security tool. Analysis of the proposed protocol and comparison with previous works in section 5 and 6 
indicate the following: (i) no disclosure of secret information (ii) no dependency on previously used 
secret data/information (iv) resiliency against niffing/eavesdropping, and replay attacks is guaranteed (iii) 
the protocol is free from desynchronization issues (v) lower computational complexity (vi) lower time 
complexity. 
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